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Abstract: In the early 90s, researchers began to focus on security as an 
important property to address in combination with safety. Over the years, 
researchers have proposed approaches to harmonize activities within the 
safety and security disciplines. Despite the academic efforts to identify 
interdependencies and to propose combined approaches for safety and 
security, there is still a lack of integration between safety and security practices 
in the industrial context, as they have separate standards and independent 
processes often addressed and assessed by different organizational teams and 
authorities. Specifically, security concerns are generally not covered in any 
detail in safety standards potentially resulting in successfully safety-certified 
systems that still are open for security threats from e.g., malicious intents from 
internal and external personnel and hackers that may jeopardize safety. In 
recent years security has again received an increasing attention of being an 
important issue also in safety assurance, as the open interconnected nature of 
emerging systems makes them susceptible to security threats at a much higher 
degree than existing more confined products. 
 
This article presents initial ideas on how to extend safety work to include 
aspects of security during the context establishment and initial risk assessment 
procedures. The ambition of our proposal is to improve safety and increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of the safety work within the frames of the current 
safety standards, i.e., raised security awareness in compliance with the current 
safety standards. We believe that our proposal is useful to raise the security 
awareness in industrial contexts, although it is not a complete harmonization of 
safety and security disciplines, as it merely provides applicable guidance to 
increase security awareness in a safety context. 
Introduction 
Software intensive safety-critical systems have been around for a few decades 
now and there are well-established approaches for ensuring their safety, 
essentially originating from safety practices within the aerospace industries. 
Safety practices in these and other domains are dictated by safety-standards 
that prescribe how systems should be developed, verified and maintained to 
minimize risks of accidents during the lifetime of a product. When developing 
safety related electronic and programmable control systems, there are a 
number of sector specific standards that need to be considered, for example:  																																																								1	This	work	was	performed	in	the	FIA-PiiA	project	within	the	Swedish	national	Vinnova	funded	strategic	innovation	programme	Process-industrial	IT	and	Automation;	www.piia-sip.se	and	in	the	SafeCOP	project	www.safecop.eu	funded	from	the	ECSEL	joint	undertaking	under	grant	agreement	n692529	2	Mälardalen	University	(kaj.hanninen@mdh.se)	3	SICS	Swedish	ICT	Västerås	and	Mälardalen	University	(hansh@sics.se)	4	Safety	Integrity	AB	(henrik.thane@safetyintegrity.se)	5	SICS	Swedish	ICT	Västerås	(mehrdad@sics.se)	
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• ISO13849 and IEC62061 for machines with moving parts (e.g., Industrial 
robots), 
• ISO26262 for Automotive,  
• EN50129/EN50128 for Railway, and 
• IEC61508 for generic control systems 
 
These standards outline the requirements and recommendations for the safety 
work in the respective domain. Many of the sector specific standards that have 
been developed in recent years stem from the IEC61508 standard. In 
developing a sector specific standard the IEC61508 has been a fundamental 
source of inspiration for the developers of sector specific standards. Some 
concepts from the IEC61508 have been adapted as is, whereas other concepts 
have been reworked to fit the practices in the specific domains. 
Safety-related systems connected to the Internet 
Traditionally, safety related systems have been closed stand-alone products, 
but recently they are increasingly interconnected or provided with interfaces to 
the Internet to allow remote diagnostics or enhanced Infotainment as in the 
case of modern cars. Allowing external communication is an enabler for many 
useful and exciting functions and services, but is also potentially dangerous, as 
it opens up for a whole range of security threats. An example is the remote 
operation of a Jeep Cherokee6 via the infotainment interface, allowing remote 
control of braking and steering. A more classical example is the Stuxnet Worm7 
that specifically targets PLCs, which are used in automation of e.g., machinery 
on factory assembly lines. Stuxnet is believed to be a jointly built American-
Israeli cyber weapon, built to target Iranian centrifuges for separating nuclear 
material. Further examples include hacked insulin pumps and drug infusion 
pumps. Hacks of the latter have even prompted warnings from the US FDA8 
resulting in guidance on how to address cyber-security to assure safety of 
medical devices. There are also examples of hacks causing damage to the 
environment, including a disgruntled former employee that hacked a water 
treatment facility in Queensland, Australia, deliberately spilling nearly a million 
liters of raw sewage into local waterways and parks9. 
Although there are well-established security engineering lifecycles, it should be 
clear from the above examples that there is a lack of guidance on how to 
combine and exchange knowledge and results of the work in the disciplines. 
Moreover, the distinction between safety and security is not always clear. What 
is clear however is that security threats must be considered in the safety work, 
as system safety (beyond any reasonable doubt) cannot be established for 
modern open interconnected systems unless the safety work is extended to 
take aspects of security into account. Nevertheless, current safety standards 
do generally not prescribe that security threats shall be evaluated in terms of 
potential hazards, and consequently there are no requirements on mitigations 
of those threats.  																																																								6	http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/	7	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet	8http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/SafetyAlertsforHumanMedicalProducts/ucm456832.htm	9	http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/ics/documents/Maroochy-Water-Services-Case-Study_report.pdf	
 3 
 
For instance, the railway standards EN50126, EN50128 and EN50129 describe 
security as an element that can be considered as a component of RAMS 
(Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety). However, the consideration of 
security is outside the scope of the standards (with the exception of security in 
terms of protection against unauthorized access). The road vehicle standard 
ISO26262 do not mention security at all. The IEC61508 standard recommends 
that reasonably foreseeable security threats originating from malevolent or 
unauthorized action should be analyzed. For guidance on vulnerability and risk 
analysis the standard refers to IEC62443. 
 
The main reason why security is given less attention in the safety standards is 
the limit of scope that all functional safety standards prescribe. They are 
essentially restricted to protection against failures and a degree of foreseeable 
misuse of the systems, not against intentional abuse and misuse. 
 
Safety standards are out of synch with recent developments 
Although some safety standards recommend addressing security, it is perfectly 
possible to get a product approved according to safety standards, while there 
are still remaining security dependencies that could impact safety and cause 
an accident. This does not imply that the safety or security works are flawed, 
contrary it implies that addressing of the interdependencies between them are 
not regulated or guided enough in normative safety standards. As companies 
tend to focus on getting an approval by safety-certification authorities, rather 
than ensuring safety under all conditions including security threats. If this 
practice is not amended, we are bound to see incidents and accidents in the 
near future.  
 
In these perspectives the long revision periods of safety standards is a real and 
serious problem. The committees working on these standards are catching up 
with new developments in the industry in terms of new technologies, increased 
complexity, new application domains, etc. As such, the standards are often out-
of-date, and have usually a 10-year turnaround time between new versions. 
Thus, the rapid technical development is in itself a threat to safety. Updating 
and extending the scope of standards is however not a simple task. Considering 
that it is non-trivial to understand the interdependencies and differences 
between modern safety critical and security critical systems, regulating 
processes and providing recommendations for activities and allocation of 
responsibilities in assuring risk reduction, becomes extremely difficult.  
Considering security risks in the safety management process 
Our claim is that an extended safety approach, considering relevant aspects of 
security together with safety, is required to amend the current practice. For the 
approach to be applicable in industrial contexts, and approvable by assessment 
authorities, the extension must be performed in such way that the proposals 
complies with the normative safety standards. A harmonization of the activities 
within the practices has been subject for the research community since the 
early 90s (see e.g., [2]-[61]; [55] presents an extensive survey of approaches 
combining safety and security). A problem with extensive harmonization 
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approaches is that they may invalidate recommended normative activities, 
recommendations or practices in the standards. This implies that they need to 
be adapted by standardization authorities, i.e., they are generally not directly 
applicable in an industrial context, unless the normative standards are updated 
to support them. A typical example of this is the efforts in harmonization of risk 
classification schemes/procedures of different disciplines. 
Safety and Security in an industrial Case Study 
We have taken initial steps towards development of an extended safety 
approach in the context of current standards. We considered a wide range of 
security threats and applied a safety standard (IEC62061 – “Safety of 
Machinery”) and a security standard (ISA/IEC-62443, “Industrial 
communication networks”) on a real industrial case. These standards both have 
the goal to reduce risk, but have somewhat different approaches to manage 
risk. We have studied the standards, identified commonalities and differences, 
and based on the differences we have extended the regular safety risk 
management to include security threats.  
 
In the following we outline the basic steps to extend the activities of a risk 
management process that complies with IEC62061. 
 
• Extending the System Definition: The system definition is the 
foundation on which all succeeding functional safety work is based. It 
defines the scope and intended functionality of the product, its 
environment, as well as its interfaces. All risk analysis is based on the 
system definition. Specifically, the hazards identification process starts 
from the system definition in identifying all hazards that can lead to 
accidents, incidents, damage or significant financial losses. It is 
therefore important that the system definition is complete and correct to 
facilitate the identification of all potential sources of hazards. With the 
increasing interconnectivity of modern automation control systems, the 
functional safety system definition must be extended to cover not only 
failures from within the product itself, but also intentional misuse and 
sabotage. 
 
In doing this, the traditional reasoning about sources of hazards (failures 
and foreseeable misuse) must be extended to also include intentional 
misuse. This implies that the failure model of the environment and 
interface parts of the system definition will have to be extended with 
actors and assets being part of, or interfacing, the system. With the 
complexity and interconnection of entities within modern systems, the 
establishment of a system definition is however not trivial. To support the 
definition process, guidance on typical assets and actors that may affect 
operations are necessary. Within our work, we identified the following 
threats and interfaces as important to consider when extending a typical 
safety system definition (note that the list is not complete in any sense, 
it is purely for guidance) 
• People (internal and external personnel, design authorities, 
subcontractors, competitors, litigants, press, hackers, criminals, 
terrorist etc.) 
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• Nature and accidents (e.g., fires, storms, floods, transportation 
accidents etc.) 
• Interfaces and assets (e.g. fieldbuses and I/O for system 
functionality, internal product buses and interfaces, sensors, 
actuators, configuration interfaces, control interfaces, monitoring 
interfaces and diagnostics interfaces, maintenance interfaces, 
testing interfaces and upgrading interfaces, infotainment 
interfaces, external product interfaces (e.g., authentication and 
authorization interfaces, session management interfaces, USB 
interfaces etc.), cellular interfaces and additional assets such as., 
mobile-enabled devices, printers, USB devices, control centers, 
cloud services, computers, etc.). 
 
The idea with the guidance list is to identify points allowing tampering 
with wireless and wired communication links, USB ports, user 
interfaces, etc. and tampering by personnel (both internal and 
external) during development, testing, maintenance, production, and 
operation. These assets and actors must all be included as 
extensions to the traditional system definition and thus the scope and 
boundary of a traditional system definition will be extended 
thereafter.  
 
Establishing a system definition has traditionally been the 
responsibility of the safety organization. It is clear that this work 
cannot be performed by the safety organization alone. We cannot 
expect them to have the overall knowledge of everything included in 
modern interconnected systems. Instead, establishing a system 
definition should be a joint work that gathers the organizational teams 
that together can contribute with their knowledge in an effort to 
establish a complete and correct definition. 
 
• Extending the Hazards Analysis: Hazard analysis is the second most 
important step (after writing the system definition) in the safety 
management process of developing safety critical systems. The purpose 
of the analysis is to identify, quantify, rank, and list hazards that can 
cause accidents or losses during the lifetime of the product. The hazard 
analysis can be performed with various techniques, and at different 
stages of the lifecycle. A preliminary hazard analysis is usually 
performed in the concept phase before any development has been 
initiated. The hazard analysis is then refined when more details of the 
system design emerges, and repeated when performing maintenance. A 
typical hazard analysis that focuses on safety is guided by experiences 
from similar projects and different analysis techniques such as fault tree 
analyses, failure mode and effects analyses, event tree analyses etc. 
The security domain has similar guidance from e.g., threat models, 
attack tree analyses etc. In our extension of the hazard analysis, we 
include security threats in the safety analysis, where we essentially 
assume that failures are not only stemming from the system itself but 
also from people with malicious intent. The extended scope of the 
system definition allows for previously unforeseen safety hazards, and 
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additional ways in which a system might enter a hazardous state, to be 
identified. This results in a more security-aware safety management 
process. 
 
• Risk Classification and Mitigations: Each hazard that has been 
identified during the hazard analysis must be classified in terms of risk10 
according to the schemes proposed in the safety standards. The new 
security related hazards that have been found using the extend hazard 
analysis have therefore to be classified according to the same scheme. 
Note that this does not imply that the risk classification proposed by the 
security standards should be ignored for security risks. The reason to 
classify the security related safety risks according to a safety scheme 
serves two main purposes: 1) to assure compliance with the safety 
standard being used and 2) to assure that all safety risks have been 
classified according to the same scheme. Note also that risk 
classification stemming from any reused sources of already identified 
hazards may have to be re-assessed11 since the scope of the system 
definition has changed. All hazards (new as well as old) must then be 
mitigated with safety measures that are on par with the risk classification 
of the hazard in order to be able to claim that the risk is tolerable. The 
functional safety standards mandate different levels of rigor for the 
development and maintenance process, including techniques and 
measures to be applied depending on the identified risk level (SIL, ASIL, 
PL, etc.). A consequence of our extended analysis is that proper 
mitigations may not be found in the safety standards, but have to be 
taken from the security standards. Here it is necessary to translate the 
rigor required between the different domains and standards.  
 
• Assessing Risk Mitigations: It is advisable that the safety 
management process distinguish between hazards discovered from a 
pure safety perspective, hazards discovered from a security perspective 
that have safety impact, and hazards discovered from an extended 
safety perspective that includes security threats. The main reason why 
the origins of the hazards should be categorized is the fact that this 
allows risk reduction measures to be more appropriately designed. 
Where the origins of the hazards are purely safety related (e.g., due to 
failures, foreseeable misuse etc.) the risk reduction measures, 
techniques and recommendations in safety standards may be followed. 
For the other cases the risk reduction process needs to consider if the 
risk can be reduced according to a safety standard or according to a 
security standard, or with a combination of both safety and security 
standards. Note however that in order to be able to certify the product, 
the development and maintenance process steps required in the safety 
standard must be followed in all cases when implementing mitigations 																																																								10	For	example,	IEC	62061	mandates	a	classification	procedure	that	considers	the	consequence	of	each	hazard,	the	severity	(S)	of	each	hazard,	the	anticipated	rate	(F)	of	occurrence,	the	anticipated	occurrence	probability	(P)	of	each	hazard	and	measures	for	hazard	avoidance	(A)	11	This	implies	that	reusing	experiences	and	sources	such	as	preliminary	hazard	lists	from	previous	projects	have	to	be	subject	to	reassessment	and	re-classification	even	if	the	context	and	functionality	remains	the	same	as	for	previous	analyses		
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even if the mitigation comes from a security standard.  
Reference system – Case study 
To validate our proposed approach we have studied a system for material 
transportation in a mining environment provided by the PiiA-WROOM12 project. 
The system is currently under development and will comprise a set of vehicles 
that cooperate to transport material in an underground mine. A novel 
characteristic of the system is that some vehicles can be manually or remotely 
driven during operation. When remotely driven, an operator in a control room 
above ground controls the vehicle via wired and wireless networks. An 
advantage is that when there are still hazardous dust and gases remaining after 
blasting in the mine, the vehicles can be operated remotely from above ground 
and begin transporting material before it is safe for humans to be present in the 
mine. These types of systems, with remote controlled or partially autonomous 
vehicles, are believed to become a common setup in mines. 
 
We studied the system setup and performed a preliminary hazard analysis 
according to the IEC62061 safety standard. Typically, these types of systems 
are analyzed and certified in a modular way, meaning that each vehicle or piece 
of equipment is analyzed for risks, developed and certified in isolation without 
considering security threats. To test our method we extended the system 
definition and performed an extended hazard analysis including security threats 
from intentional and accidental misuse of the system. We managed, quite 
easily, to identify new unforeseen safety hazards, and additional ways in which 
a system might enter a hazardous state. These hazards and the events leading 
to them would not have been found with a traditional safety approach, i.e., these 
hazards were not found when using the original scope of the IEC62061 system 
definition and hazards analysis, since the root causes were not considered to 
be failures. 
  
The exercise clearly shows that interconnected systems, in this case a system-
of-systems, lead to additional hazards when security is considered. The risk 
classification was done according to the IEC62061 and the security related 
hazards were also given SIL (safety integrity level) classifications. This allowed 
us to prioritize the risks and to propose suitable mitigations. Mitigation and 
countermeasures were chosen from the safety and security domains. 
 
Using this new approach, which in essence is harmonized with IEC62061, 
allows us to develop, and according to IEC62016, certify a complex 
interconnected system-of-systems subject to security threats. 
Conclusion/ Summary 
We have investigated existing functional safety standards and identified critical 
shortcomings when they are applied to networked systems: they do not 
consider security threats that may lead to accidents. Likewise, security 
standards do not cover safety aspects to the same rigor as the safety 
standards. 																																																								12	http://www.projdb.processitinnovations.se/Aktivitet.aspx?id=219	
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To remedy this, we propose an approach that considers security threats in the 
safety work process. The approach can be seen as an initial step towards an 
integrated approach for safety and security, something that will be needed for 
keeping risks of accidents and incidents in future networked cooperating 
products at acceptable levels.  
 
We applied our approach to the IEC62061 functional safety standard in a case 
study that clearly shows that we systematically can identify additional hazards 
stemming from security threats that would not have been identified using a 
traditional safety approach. Since the hazard analysis process is harmonized 
with the IEC62061 standard we believe that it is now possible to develop and 
certify complex interconnected system-of-systems according to IEC62016, 
taking security threats into account. Our approach is general and can be applied 
also to other standards.  
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